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Introduction 
 
 
The Danger of Chemical Weapons 
in Syria 
Unfinished Disarmament and International Control Efforts 
Oliver Meier 
On 4 January 2016, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
in The Hague announced that the process of destroying Syrian chemical weapons had 
been completed. Despite that declaration of success, problems obviously persist. Since 
April 2014, the civil war parties have accused each other in more than one hundred 
cases of having used chemical weapons. In more than twenty incidents the OPCW has 
confirmed the use of chemical weapons. The United States also accuses Syria of having 
kept part of its chemical arsenal. The international community has established three 
institutional mechanisms to shed light on chemical weapons-related issues. Clarifica-
tion of key questions – whether Syria still possesses a chemical weapons potential, 
where chemical weapons have been used and who is responsible for their use – under 
conditions of war will be a challenge. Despite the poor prospects of success, the investi-
gations are important to reduce the risks of further chemical weapons use. Independent 
of the state of the peace process, international control efforts should be pursued per-
sistently and with a long-term view. Wherever possible, new control capabilities devel-
oped in the context of Syrian crisis should be consolidated. 
 
The successful destruction of Syria’s declared 
chemical weapons stockpile under inter-
national monitoring has reduced the danger 
emanating from these weapons. Following 
the elimination of about 1,300 tonnes of 
chemical weapons, including the nerve 
agent sarin, and their precursors, Syria’s 
chemical weapons programme no longer 
poses strategic threat to Israel. Nor can 
these stocks now fall into the hands of 
terrorists or be used in the civil war. The 
danger of another major chemical attack 
similar to the assault with sarin close to 
Damascus on 13 August 2013 that killed 
more than one thousand Syrians, mostly 
civilians, appears to have vanished. 
However, ever since Syria joined the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
on 14 September 2013, doubts have been 
expressed as to whether Damascus really 
intends to cooperate fully with the OPCW 
and the United Nations. Those concerns 
have meanwhile turned out to be justified. 
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Verifying the Syrian Declarations 
In April 2014, six months after Syria sub-
mitted its initial declaration on its chemi-
cal weapons programme to the OPCW, the 
Hague-based organisation set up a Decla-
ration Assessment Team (DAT) to clarify 
“anomalies and discrepancies” in the Syrian 
statements. In the course of about a dozen 
meetings with the government in Damas-
cus the OPCW team uncovered that the 
Syrian declaration of its chemical weapons 
was neither comprehensive nor accurate. 
Damascus repeatedly had to correct and 
amend its statements. 
For example, Syria subsequently dis-
closed one additional chemical weapons 
plant and three previously undeclared 
research and development facilities. Almost 
all the declared chemical weapons produc-
tion facilities have now been destroyed, 
although in one case the security situation 
continues to delay destruction. The DAT’s 
significant findings include the revelation 
that Syria had worked on ricin, a toxin 
whose misuse for hostile purposes is pro-
hibited by both the Biological Weapons 
Convention and the CWC. 
Syria claimed that incomplete and incor-
rect declarations were the result of careless-
ness and a lack of administrative resources. 
Russia, as President Bashar al-Assad’s ally, 
took a similar line, arguing that the destruc-
tion of the declared stocks had “solved the 
problem” of Syrian chemical weapons. 
Others, particularly Western states accuse 
Syria of deliberately concealing the full 
extent of its chemical programme. These 
countries continue to doubt Syria’s good 
faith. 
At its March meeting, the OPCW’s Execu-
tive Council stated that there had been 
noprogress in clarifying nine of the seven-
teen outstanding issues, and requested the 
OPCW’s Director-General to support the 
DAT by discussing these questions directly 
with Syrian government representatives. 
Investigating Chemical Weapons 
Incidents 
Repeated reports about chemical weapons 
use in the civil war make the DAT reports 
on omissions in the Syrian declarations 
especially alarming. The government and 
opposition accuse each other of using 
chemical weapons. Yet, allegations that the 
regime has been using chemical weapons, 
either from undeclared stocks or produced 
in undeclared facilities, have taken the cen-
tre of attention. The possibility that such 
clandestine stocks could have fallen into 
the hands of non-state actors is equally 
unsettling. 
At the end of April 2014, OPCW Director-
General Ahmet Üzümcü set up a Fact-Find-
ing Mission (FFM) to investigate the veracity 
of chemical weapons incidents in Syria 
reported after 21 August 2013. 
The inspectors have been operating 
under the most difficult of circumstances. 
They came under fire during one of their 
first on-site visits in May 2014 and had to 
abandon the planned investigation. 
Nonetheless, by the end of 2015 the FFM 
had presented six reports. These reports 
were based on a range of sources. FFM inves-
tigators analysed media reports and con-
ducted interviews with victims and doctors 
(sometimes by telephone or videoconfer-
encing). It was also helpful that the FFM 
was able to rely on the support of an OPCW 
presence in Damascus. 
The FFM’s reports mention 116 incidents 
since April 2014 where chemical weapons 
have reportedly been used in Syria. The 
OPCW investigated twenty-nine of these and 
concluded with a probability that in twenty-
three cases toxic chemical substances – 
mostly chlorine or mustard gas – had been 
misused as a means of warfare. 
Russia argues that the FFM findings 
support its view that terrorist groups were 
responsible for the continuing chemical 
weapons use. But that interpretation can-
not be reconciled with all of the descrip-
tions confirmed by the FFM. For example, 
cylinders of chlorine gas were dropped 
from helicopters operating in airspace 
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controlled by the Syrian government. The 
United States and others therefore argue 
that Damascus must have been responsible 
for at least some of the chemical weapons 
attacks. 
Assigning Blame 
The Joint Investigative Mission (JIM) is the 
most ambitious of the three instruments 
(alongside DAT and FFM), established to clari-
fy the extent of the Syrian chemical weap-
ons programme and ascertain the circum-
stances surrounding chemical weapons use 
in Syria. On 7 August 2015, the Security 
Council established the JIM as a joint instru-
ment of the OPCW and the United Nations 
to “identify to the greatest extent feasible 
individuals, entities, groups, or govern-
ments who were perpetrators, organisers, 
sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of 
chemicals as weapons, including chlorine 
or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian 
Arab Republic”. 
For a long time, Russia had opposed 
the establishment of such a mechanism 
because it wanted to avoid an investigation 
focused on the Assad regime. Moscow there-
fore insisted on also investigating accusa-
tions that the Islamic State had used chemi-
cal weapons against Kurdish forces. The 
Security Council was able to establish the 
JIM by unanimous vote only after Baghdad 
invited the OPCW to investigate allegations 
concerning the use of chemical weapons 
against the Peshmerga. (The OPCW has 
meanwhile confirmed the use of mustard 
gas in northern Iraq, but not specified the 
number of incidents or who was respon-
sible.) 
The activities of JIM, which began its 
work in November 2015, are restricted to 
cases already investigated by the FFM. In 
February 2016, Virginia Gamba, formerly 
director of the UN Office for Disarmament 
Affairs and now head of the JIM, presented 
a first interim report describing the mis-
sion’s methods. The JIM initially intends to 
investigate seven cases that had occurred 
between April 2014 and August 2015, 
selected above all because investigating 
them appears less difficult than other com-
parable incidents. 
Nonetheless, reliable, comprehensive 
findings are not to be expected within the 
JIM’s one-year mandate. Although the JIM 
intends to draw on a multitude of sources 
and contacts, Syria’s catastrophic security 
situation and ever-changing political cir-
cumstances are likely to hamper the inves-
tigation. 
What Next? 
Over the past two years, the issue of Syrian 
chemical weapons has dropped out of the 
headlines. This is understandable, given 
that the destruction of large quantities of 
sarin greatly has reduced the threat they 
posed. In comparison to the many thou-
sands of victims of bullets, bombs and other 
conventional weapons in the civil war, 
far fewer Syrians are killed or injured by 
chemical weapons. For Russia and the 
United States, the success of their coopera-
tion in destroying Syrian chemical weapons 
demonstrates the effectiveness of their co-
operation on non-proliferation (as does the 
resolution of the conflict over the Iranian 
nuclear programme). Reports of chemical 
weapon attacks undermine that narrative. 
And there is another political factor behind 
international reticence to address the issue: 
Where external actors tend to exonerate 
their own clients from allegations of chemi-
cal weapons possession and use, such 
allegations often come to be perceived mere 
war propaganda. 
International efforts to eliminate chemi-
cal weapons in Syria and investigate on-
going attacks remain important despite – 
and because of – this difficult mix of fac-
tors. The international community’s shared 
interest in exposing, condemning, prosecut-
ing and penalising the use of chemical 
weapons can continue to bridge diverging 
interests over the civil war itself. 
Most importantly, such efforts should 
be aimed at reducing the risk of further 
chemical weapons use in Syria and the 
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broader region. Efforts to control chemical 
weapons should therefore, as far as pos-
sible, continue independent of progress 
made in the peace process. Even if it is 
under the present circumstances difficult 
to imagine that the JIM could actually 
reliably identify perpetrators, the investiga-
tions can still be relevant to expose and 
prosecute those responsible for chemical 
weapon attacks at a later stage. The evi-
dence secured can form the basis of inves-
tigations and prosecutions by the Inter-
national Criminal Court, whose Statute 
lists the use of weapons of mass destruction 
as a war crime. That is another reason why 
it is so important for the Security Council 
to extend the JIM’s mandate as soon as 
possible. 
It is not clear what access terrorist groups 
have to chemical weapons stocks in Syria 
and whether they have been able to co-opt 
experts from the government’s chemical 
weapons programme. There is a real risk of 
terrorists using Syrian chemical weapons 
in third countries. The Islamic State’s use 
of mustard gas in Iraq is particularly 
unsettling, also for Europe. After the Paris 
attacks in November 2015, French Prime 
Minister Manuel Valls warned specifically 
of the possibility of terrorist attacks with 
chemical weapons. The Russian proposal 
of starting talks on a new international con-
vention banning chemical terrorism is at 
least worth consideration. 
Finally, the destruction of Syrian chemi-
cal weapons demonstrates the effectiveness 
of international disarmament organisations. 
Few would have expected the OPCW of 
being capable of playing such a prominent 
role in this process. In 2013, it received the 
Nobel Peace Prize for its achievements. Yet, 
the capacities of international organisa-
tions like the OPCW to control chemical 
weapons and other weapons of mass de-
struction in crisis regions needs to be 
bolstered. The EU’s contribution of €4.6 
million to the FFM and the JIM in Novem-
ber 2015 represents an important step 
towards that objective. It would be even 
better, however, if the regular budgets of 
OPCW and UN were increased so as to enable 
them to fulfil such tasks on a continuous 
basis. In view of the prevalence of crises in 
the world, and especially in the Middle East 
– where there are still huge gaps in the 
application of international control mecha-
nisms – the danger remains that the chemi-
cal weapons use in Syria will not be the last 
of such incidents. 
The long-term objective, of course, is still 
a complete prohibition of chemical weap-
ons. That alone will end neither the killing 
in Syria, nor the endless suffering of the 
Syrians. In the best-case scenario, however, 
the credible threat of political and legal 
consequences will deter those responsible 
from further use. But above all, the activi-
ties of the international community send 
a clear message to other states that posses-
sion and use of chemical weapons will have 
consequences. 
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